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REDISCOVERED TREASURES OF LOUISIANA 
LAW 
HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF LOUISIANA AND OF THE 
CIVIL LAW 
Thomas J. Semmes* 
INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW PUBLICATION 
Thomas Jenkins Semmes (1824-1899) was once described as 
“the most distinguished statesman and brilliant lawyer of the 
south.”1 Born in Georgetown, D.C., in a mercantile family of 
English and French descent, he graduated from Georgetown 
College in 1842 and received a law degree from Harvard in 1845. 
He practiced law in Washington, D.C., till 1850, when he moved to 
New Orleans. He became a leader of the Democratic Party and was 
soon elected a member of the Louisiana House of Representatives. 
He later served as a member of the Louisiana Constitutional 
Conventions of 1879 and 1898.2 A U.S. Attorney in New Orleans 
and later state Attorney General, he became a strong advocate of 
secession. He served in the Confederate Senate from 1862 to 1865 
and, after having received presidential pardon, he returned to New 
Orleans to practice law. He became a professor of law at the 
University of Louisiana, later to become Tulane University. There 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, University of Louisiana (1873-1899). This lecture 
was first published by Melvin M. Cohen and Joseph A. Quintero in New 
Orleans through Clark and Hofeline, Book Printers, 9 Bank Place, in 1873; it 
was republished in 1875 in 3 LA REVUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION ET DE 
JURISPRUDENCE DU CANADA 405. 
 1.  JAMES S. EASBY-SMITH, 2 GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY IN THE DISTRICT 
OF COLUMBIA (1789-1907), ITS FOUNDERS, BENEFACTORS, OFFICERS, 
INSTRUCTORS AND ALUMNI 146 (1907). See for more detail, CHARLES ROBSON, 
REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF THE SOUTH 529-551 (1880). 
 2.  Georgia Chadwick, Thomas Semmes, 5 DE NOVO, THE NEWSLETTER OF 
THE LAW LIBRARY OF LOUISIANA, Issue 3, 7 (2007).  
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he taught civil law (1873-1879) and common law (1879-1899), till 
the day of his sudden death.3  
The Journal of Civil Law Studies owes to Mr. Louis de la 
Vergne the rediscovery of this inaugural lecture, first published as 
a book in New Orleans in 1873. Ms. Georgia Chadwick4 was 
instrumental in having the text entirely retyped and edited. The 
lecture proves the vast expertise and intimate knowledge Semmes 
had of the civil law tradition and its impact in Louisiana, at the 
moment he started an academic career, at the age of forty-nine. He 
was an accomplished scholar. The first part of the text gives a very 
informative and accurate survey of the history of Louisiana law till 
the revision of its Civil Code in 1870. The second part explains 
how the civil law tradition evolved in Rome, from the Law of the 
Twelve Tables to Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis, discussing the 
main steps of the evolution and their significance. 
At a time where many a legal scholar would devote fifty pages 
to the discussion of a small problem, it is good to remember old 
masters who could cover with clarity and accuracy centuries of 
legal history in half this volume. To readers looking for a short but 
informative account of the development of the civil law tradition in 
Louisiana and its interaction with the common law until the post-
Civil War years, Semmes gives a most useful and readable answer. 
In Louisiana or in other parts of the world, teachers of comparative 
law and of legal traditions may safely use this text. If pressed to 
cover the development of Roman law in just one class or two, they 
will find in the second part of Semmes’ lecture a most useful and 
reliable guide. 
The short book was retyped from the original at the Louisiana 
Law Library, and edited by Ms. Jennifer Lane at the LSU Center of 
Civil Law Studies. It is published with minimal edits, aiming at 
                                                                                                             
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Law Librarian of Louisiana, Executive Director, Supreme Court of 
Louisiana Historical Society, and Curator, Supreme Court of Louisiana 
Museum. 
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making the text easily readable in the 21st century. Sequentially 
numerical footnotes are references by the author, sometimes 
complemented by the editors. Additional editorial notes are 
announced by an asterisk.  
Olivier Moréteau 
 
PREFACE TO THE ORIGINAL EDITION 
The following introductory lecture, delivered by the Hon. 
Thomas J. Semmes, Professor of Civil Law in the Louisiana 
University, at the opening of the Institution, needs no comment. 
The reputation of the writer, as a jurist of eminent ability, is as 
firmly established, as it is universally conceded. Of his study, 
culture, and research, the reader can best judge from a perusal of 
the lecture. As elaborate in detail as the limits of a discourse will 
sanction, it is as pointed in application, as the scope of the subject 
justifies, and doubtless establishes its authenticity, by the citations 
it introduces. 
We present it to the profession in the conviction of its affording 
them satisfaction; and grateful for the favors conferred in their 
patronage, hope to offer them other lectures on equally valuable 
legal themes. 
The Publishers 
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Thomas Semmes* 
I. AN EPITOME OF THE HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE LAWS OF 
LOUISIANA AND OF THE CIVIL LAW 
Before I enter upon the consideration of the history and sources 
of the civil law, I propose to review the history and sources of the 
laws of Louisiana. In Louisiana, the civil law prevails, and it is the 
only state in the federal union, carved out of the vast territories 
acquired by the United States from France, Spain and Mexico, in 
which the civil law has been retained as the basis of jurisprudence. 
The common law modified by statute dominates all our sister 
states. 
The intimate relations and intercourse between the people of 
Louisiana and the citizens of other state, have given rise, in our 
courts, in consequence of the dissimilarity of the two systems of 
                                                                                                             
 *  Engraving of Thomas Semmes, from REPRESENTATIVE MEN OF THE 
SOUTH (Chas. Robson & Co., Philadelphia, 1880), a volume in the Rare Book 
Collection of the Law Library of Louisiana. 
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law, to more numerous and intricate questions of conflict of laws 
than in the courts of any other state. 
Happily for us, many of these questions were considered and 
adjudicated while Chief Justice Martin was, by his ability and 
learning, the ornament of our supreme judicial tribunal. 
You will perceive in Story’s elaborate work on the Conflict of 
Laws,5 numerous and copious references to the decisions of the 
Louisiana courts. The conflict of laws is a subject daily considered 
by the legal practitioner in Louisiana, and I commend it to your 
careful study, as an essential branch of the law, and necessary to fit 
you for the intelligent performance of your professional duties. 
Louisiana was settled by the French in 1699, and was subject to 
the dominion of France until August 1769, when it was taken 
possession of by Alejandro O’Reilly for Spain under a secret treaty 
concluded in November 1762, but not made public until April 23, 
1764. About three months after taking possession, O’Reilly 
published in the French language extracts from the whole body of 
the Spanish law, with references to the books in which they are 
contained, purporting to be intended for elementary instruction to 
the inhabitants of the province. This publication, followed by an 
uninterrupted observance of the Spanish law, was received as an 
introduction into the Louisiana of the Spanish Code in all its parts.6  
The laws of Spain are contained in various codes, the most 
complete of which is known under the name of “Las Sieté 
Partidas.” The other codes are the Fuero Juzgo, Fuero Viejo and 
Fuero Real: to which may be added the laws regulating the 
practice of courts, the Royal Ordinances (Ordenancas Reales de 
Castilla), and those of Alcala; the Laws of Toro, the Recopilacion 
de Castilla, and the Recopilacion de las Indias. 
                                                                                                             
 5. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, originally 
published by Hilliard, Gray, and Company in 1834. 
 6. FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, 4 THE HISTORY OF LOUISIANA: FROM THE 
EARLIEST PERIOD 368 (2000), originally published by Lyman and Beardslee, 
New Orleans, in 1827.  
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The Fuero Juzgo was published about the year 693. It was first 
published in Latin under the title of “Forum Judicum” and 
afterward translated into Spanish in the 13th century under 
Ferdinand III. It was originally called “El Fuero de los Jueces,” 
but this name was changed by corruption of words into Fuero 
Juzgo, and under that title it was published in the year 1600. 
The Fuero Viejo was published in the year 992, and contains 
the ancient customs and usages of the Spanish nation. 
Alphonso the Wise, desiring to establish a uniform 
jurisprudence in all his dominions, published a third code, under 
the name of “Fuero Real;” this was the precursor of the Partidas, 
which Alphonso had ordered to be compiled, and is to the 
Partidas, what the Institutes of Justinian are to the Pandects. 
The Partidas is the most perfect system of Spanish laws; they 
were compiled in imitation of the Pandects, and as a digest of the 
laws of Spain, are worthy of the praise bestowed on them by jurists 
of every country.  
The work was projected by Ferdinand III, but accomplished by 
his son and successor, Alphonso the Wise, who appointed four 
jurists to execute it. This task was entered upon in the year 1256, 
and finished in seven years. Strange to say, the names of these 
enlightened jurists have not been preserved. All those parts of the 
new code relating to religious matters, were compiled from the 
canonical laws of Spain: those which relate to civil and criminal 
matters, are derived principally from the Roman laws, which were 
freely translated without acknowledgment of the fact. The Partidas 
were not promulgated until 1343, and were not actually put in 
operation until 1505, when Ferdinand and Joanna gave them their 
sanction at the Cortez held that year in the city of Toro. 
The Partidas are divided into seven parts, each part divided 
into titles, and each title sub-divided into laws. 
The first part details the canons and liturgy of the church. The 
second is a summary of the ancient usages of the Spanish nation 
and of the rules of its government. The third, fifth and sixth parts 
2012] HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF LOUISIANA 319 
 
 
 
contain an abridgment of the principles of the Roman laws on 
actions, suits, judgments, contracts, successions, testaments, 
minority and tutorship. The fourth is a compendium of the laws 
relative to marriage and family relations, legitimate and 
illegitimate, freedom, slavery and enfranchisement. The seventh 
details crimes, offences, and punishments, and, in imitation of the 
Pandects, concludes with one title on the signification of words, 
and another on the rules of law. 
The Partidas contain the fundamental principles of the Spanish 
law, expressed with grace, with simplicity and in the purest idiom 
of the Spanish language. The elevation of the sentiments of the 
Pandects has attracted the admiration of the learned. They contain 
these remarkable words, “despotism tears the tree up by the roots; 
a wise monarch prunes its branches.” 
The Laws of Toro were published at the Cortez held at the city 
of Toro, in 1505; they relate principally to wills, successions and 
donations. 
The Royal Ordinance was published by Ferdinand and Isabella 
in 1496; it is divided into eight books and the greatest part of it has 
been inserted in the Recopilacion of Castilla, which completes the 
system of Spanish legislation. This Recopilacion was published by 
Philip II, in the year 1567. The Ordinance of Alcala, the Royal 
Ordinance and the Laws of the Toro, are contained in it. 
The laws of Spain regulated and governing her immense 
dominions in America were collected and digested by order of 
Philip IV, and published in the year 1661, in the Recopilacion de 
las Indias. 
The transfer from France to Spain did not change the system of 
law governing the territory; for the civil law, as a system, then was, 
and now is, the law of both those nations. Spain, so far as 
possession affected our laws, remained in possession until 1803, 
when Louisiana was transferred to the United States. 
It is true the territory was acquired from France during the 
administration of Mr. Jefferson, for by the Treaty of Ildefonso, in 
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the year 1800, Spain had retroceded Louisiana to France, but the 
actual possession of France lasted only from November 30, 1803 
to December 20, 1803. During this brief interval no material 
change in the law was made. The French merely re-established the 
Code noir of Louis XV, prescribing rules for the government of 
slaves, and substituted a mayor and council in the place of the 
Cabildo, for the administration of affairs of the city of New 
Orleans. 
Therefore, so far as our law is concerned, it may be said that it 
was French from 1699 to 1769 and Spanish from 1769 to 1803. 
But as French and Spanish law both descend from the same parent 
source, the changes made during Spanish rule, so far as private 
rights are concerned, were not radical, but modifications of the 
system founded by the French. 
The material changes consisted in the substitution of the 
Spanish for the French language in all legal proceedings, the 
introduction of Spanish laws respecting public order, and the 
disposition of the national domain. It is thus perceived, that at the 
time Louisiana came into the possession of the United States, her 
law was a system established by the French and modified by the 
Spanish, but derived from the civil law that was common to both 
peoples. 
By the Treaty of Paris, the inhabitants of Louisiana became 
citizens of the United States, and were guaranteed the enjoyment 
of their liberty, property, and religion. 
Congress, in anticipation of the transfer, on the October 31, 
1803, provided for the temporary government of the territory by a 
statute vesting all the military, civil and judicial powers exercised 
by the officers of the existing government, in such person or 
persons as the President might appoint, to be exercised in such 
manner as the President might direct. By act of Congress approved 
March 26, 1804, a territorial government was organized under the 
name of the “Territory of Orleans.” The territory described in that 
act embraced all the territory of the present state of Louisiana, and 
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separated it from the residue of the Louisiana cession, as described 
in the Treaty of Paris. For at the time of transfer, Louisiana, as 
acquired from France, embraced all of the country from the Gulf of 
Mexico to the 49th parallel of latitude, and from the Mississippi 
River to the Rocky Mountains. 
Although the terms of the territorial act of 1804 embraced the 
territory now comprised within the limits of the state of Louisiana, 
the part of the state commonly called the “Florida Parishes” was at 
that time actually in possession of Spain and was held by her until 
the year 1810. 
The territorial act of 1804 vested the legislative power in a 
governor, appointed by the president, and thirteen persons who 
were to be appointed annually by the president. But on March 2, 
1805, Congress authorized the president to establish in Louisiana a 
government similar to that existing in the “Mississippi Territory.” 
That governance had been created by adopting the Ordinance of 
1787, relative to territory northwest of the Ohio River, excluding 
the portion of the ordinance regulating successions and the last 
article prohibiting slavery. It is thus perceived that the celebrated 
Ordinance of 1787 regulated the form of government existing in 
Louisiana until she was admitted into the Union as an independent 
state. The second article of the Ordinance of 1787 guaranteed, 
among other fundamental rights, the benefit of writ of habeas 
corpus, the right of trial by jury, and judicial proceedings 
according to the course of the common law. 
The first important and radical change made by the new 
government in the laws of the territory was the necessary result of 
the change of rulers and of the guarantees contained in the 
Ordinance of 1787. 
The criminal law and proceedings of the Latin races of Europe, 
whose absolute governments ignored the guarantees contained in 
our Federal Constitution, were repugnant to the Anglo-Saxon ideas 
of individual liberty and constitutional limitations of governmental 
power, which predominated in the American mind. The territorial 
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statute of May 4, 1805, defined what acts should constitute crimes 
and offences and provided for the trial and punishment of 
offenders. In so doing, the language and terms of the common law 
of England were used, and the following provision was embodied 
in the act, viz:  
All the crimes, offences, and misdemeanors hereinbefore 
mentioned, shall be taken, intended and construed 
according to, and in conformity with, the common law of 
England, and the forms of indictment, (divested, however, 
of unnecessary prolixity,) the method of trial, the rules of 
evidence, and all other proceedings whatsoever, in the 
prosecution of said crimes, offences and misdemeanors, 
changing what ought to be changed, shall be (except by this 
act otherwise provided for) according to the common law. 
This section of the act of 1805 had never been repealed; even 
in the Revised Statutes of 1870, it is expressly excepted in the 
general repealing clause contained in the last section of the 
statutes. The result of this enactment was an entire displacement of 
the existing criminal law of the territory, and the substitution of the 
provisions of the act in its stead. Hence, no act of man is criminal 
in Louisiana unless a statute of the state can be produced stamping 
it as a crime or offense. There is no such thing in Louisiana as a 
common law offense; all offenses are created by statute. The 
common law is resorted to for purpose of interpretation and 
construction of the terms of the statutes creating offenses, but 
criminality cannot be predicated on an act that the legislature has 
not, in express terms, denounced as crime or offense. 
An additional result of this statute of 1805 is that the common 
law of England, as construed and interpreted in 1805, is the 
standard by which we are governed; hence, no change or 
modifications of the English laws affect our criminal jurisprudence 
in Louisiana, unless adopted by statute. In addition, the English 
decisions and the opinions of English commentators since 1805, in 
opposition to the decisions and standard works prior to that period, 
are not authoritative expositions of our criminal law. 
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The next important legislative measure was a codification of 
the civil law of the Territory. Prior to this codification, the laws 
were in the Spanish language, and the fact that the vast majority of 
the people were of French descent and Americans, rendered it 
necessary that the new compilation should be published in English 
and French. It is generally supposed that the Civil Code of 
Louisiana∗ is but a re-enactment of the Code Napoleon, but such is 
not the fact. It is true that French code preceded our Code of 1808 
by four years, and a projet of it may have suggested to our 
legislators the idea of codification; however, at the time of the 
preparation of the Louisiana Code of 1808, the Code Napoleon as 
adopted had not reached the territory. 
In June 1806, the legislature of the territory appointed two 
lawyers of eminence, James Brown and Louis Moreau Lislet, to 
prepare the Civil Code. Brown and Moreau Lislet were given 
express instructions to make the civil law, by which the territory 
was then governed, the ground work of the code. 
On March 31, 1808, the code was adopted by the Territorial 
Legislature and all ancient laws inconsistent with it were repealed. 
The effect of this was that the Spanish laws remained in force, to 
the extent to which they were not in conflict with the Code of 
1808, and they were quoted and acted on as authoritative until 
1828. 
On the March 28, 1828, the legislature repealed all the civil 
laws of the state in force prior to the Code of 1825,** except a 
portion of title ten of the Code of 1808 treating of the dissolution 
of corporations. The state of Louisiana was admitted into the 
federal Union under the dominion of the Code of 1808, and the 
Spanish laws not in conflict with that code. 
                                                                                                             
 ∗  The author refers to the Civil Code of Louisiana throughout the article. 
The actual name of the enactment is DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE 
IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS (1808). The Digest was often called the Old 
Code. 
 ** One page further, the author explains how the Digest of 1808 was 
replaced by a Civil Code in 1825. 
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On the February 20, 1811, Congress passed an act to enable the 
people of the Territory of Orleans to form a constitution and state 
government, and for the admission of said state into the Union on 
an equal footing with the original states.7  
The people in convention assembled, having framed a 
constitution and adopted the name of Louisiana as the title of the 
new state, Congress, on April 8, 1812, declared Louisiana to be 
one of the United States of America and admitted into the Union 
on an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatever. 
Provided, that it should be taken as a condition upon which the 
said state is incorporated into the Union, that the river Mississippi, 
and the navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, and into 
the Gulf of Mexico, shall be common highways and forever free as 
well to the inhabitants of said state as to the inhabitants of other 
states and the territories of the United States, without any tax, duty, 
impost of toll therefor, imposed by the said state, and that the 
above condition, and also all the other conditions and terms, 
contained in the third section of the act of 1811, shall be taken and 
deemed as fundamental conditions and terms upon which the said 
state is incorporated into the Union.8 
It was further declared, that all the laws of the United States 
not locally inapplicable were by that act extended to the said state. 
At the same time the state was organized into one federal 
judicial district, and the appointment of a District Judge of the 
United States with circuit court powers, was provided for. While 
on this subject of judicial districts, I may as well mention, that on 
July 29, 1850, by act of Congress, the state was divided into two 
judicial districts, called the Eastern and Western districts, but since 
                                                                                                             
 7. Louisiana Enabling Act, Ch. 21, 2 Stat. 641 (February 20, 1811), 
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName 
=002/llsl002.db&recNum=0678.  
 8. Admission of the State of Louisiana into the Union, Ch. 50, 2 Stat. 703 
(April 8, 1812), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId 
=llsl&fileName=002/llsl002.db&recNum=740. 
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the war∗ these two have been merged into one, styled the “District 
of Louisiana.” 
The Partidas were translated into English at the expense of the 
state, by virtue of a law passed March 3, 1819. On the March 14, 
1822, a resolution of the Legislature of the state was adopted, by 
which Messrs. Livingstone, Derbigny and Moreau Lislet, three 
distinguished members of the bar, were appointed to revise the 
Civil Code of 1808, by amending it in such a manner as they 
should think proper, and adding to it such laws in force as had not 
been adopted in that code. 
The report of these jurists was adopted by the Legislature on 
April 12, 1824 and is denominated the “Civil Code of 1825” 
because it was put in operation during that year. Many articles of 
the Codes of 1808 and 1825 are identical with articles in the Code 
Napoleon; no doubt the compilers appropriated the language of the 
Code Napoleon, or its projet, whenever the rule of the law 
intended to be established in Louisiana, was the same as that 
adopted in France. Many provisions of the Code Napoleon are not 
to be found in either of our codes, and, in some instances, the text 
of the Code Napoleon was amended to conform to our law and so 
adopted; in other instances, the Spanish law was first written in 
French and translated into English. The constitution of the state 
required the laws to be enacted in the English language, hence, in 
cases of difference between the English and French texts of the 
Code of 1825, the English text prevailed. But as the Code of 1808 
was enacted during the regime of the territorial government, when 
laws were passed in both languages, the French text of the code 
has been held to be of equal force with the English text and has 
been accepted by the courts to avoid the evils of incorrect 
translation. 
The practice of the state courts of Louisiana in civil cases was 
based on the Spanish law and was regulated by the Territorial Act 
                                                                                                             
 ∗  The author refers to the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865). 
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of 1805 and its amendments until the Code of Practice, approved in 
April 1824, was put in operation in September 1825. 
The Code of Practice, prepared by authority of the Legislative 
resolution of 1822, was written in French and many inaccuracies 
exist in the English translation. 
By the act of 1828, all other rules of proceeding in civil cases, 
except those contained in the Code of Practice, were abrogated. In 
case the Code of Practice contains any provisions contrary, or 
repugnant, to those of the Civil Code, the latter are considered as 
repealed or amended by the Code of Practice.9  
The revised Civil Code and Code of Practice adopted in 1870 
were prepared under legislative sanction. They are almost identical 
with the Codes of 1825, except that all the provisions in relation to 
slaves are omitted, and the statutory amendments, enacted from 
time to time, are incorporated in the new codes. The Codes of 1870 
are written and promulgated in the English language only, in 
conformity with the mandate of the constitution of 1868. 
The Legislature, in 1855, undertook a revision of the statutes of 
the state. This revision was effected by the enactment of many 
separate statutes, relating to various and distinct subjects; all 
previous statutes relating to a particular subject were grouped 
together and incorporated into one statute relative to that subject, 
and at the end of each revised statute was annexed a clause, 
repealing all laws on the same subject matter, except what was 
contained in the Civil Code and Code of Practice. The object of the 
Legislature was to facilitate the study of law by confining 
investigation, so far as our statutory law was concerned, to the two 
codes and the Revised Statutes. The object was not fully 
accomplished, because the courts have held that there are statutes 
previous to 1855 not repealed by that revision, as the subject of the 
un-repealed statutes is entirely omitted from the Revised Statutes 
of 1855. The Revised Statutes of 1870 are but a reenactment of the 
                                                                                                             
 9. LA. REV. STAT. §§314 & 592 (1825). 
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Revised Statutes of 1855, with amendments and additions since 
made, omitting, however, all legislation pertaining to the 
institution of slavery.  
The revising legislation of 1870 was mainly intended to 
obliterate from our system of laws every vestige of the institution 
of slavery and to accommodate our legislature to the new order of 
things, inaugurated by the various amendments of the Federal 
Constitution, or resulting from the adoption of the new 
Constitution of 1868 and the reconstruction measures of Congress. 
A projet of a commercial code was prepared under the 
resolution of 1822, but it failed to meet the approval of the 
Legislature. Questions of commercial law are, therefore, settled in 
Louisiana by reference to approved works on the subject and the 
decisions of the enlightened judicial tribunals of the civilized 
world. The decisions of the English and American courts are most 
generally consulted and accepted as authority. 
An attempt was made in 1820 to codify the criminal law of the 
state. In 1821, Edward Livingston was appointed by the 
Legislature to prepare and submit to its consideration a criminal 
code. This distinguished legist made an elaborate and scientific 
report, which increased his literary fame, but its philosophic 
speculations never received the sanction of law. 
Our lawyers, accustomed to the civilian practice, were much 
embarrassed as to the method of conducting civil cases in the 
courts of the United States. The distinction between “law and 
equity” is unknown in Louisiana practice; the courts adjudicate all 
civil cases without reference to such distinction, which is peculiar 
to countries in which the common law prevails. In Louisiana, 
where the distinction, derived from the common law system, 
between writ or error and appeal is ignored, the evidence in any 
civil case of which the court of final resort has jurisdiction is, at the 
request of either party, reduced to writing. The appellate court 
reviews the law and the fact, without regard to the circumstance of 
whether the case was tried by a jury in the court below. 
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All the evidence is transmitted to the appellate court which 
disposes of the case on its merits, even though no bills of exception 
are taken by either party, to the judgment of the court below on 
questions of law. All that is necessary to bring into activity the 
revisory power of our Supreme Court is the presentation of all the 
evidence, on which the judge below decided the case; on that 
evidence, the court will proceed to adjudicate de novo both the law 
and fact involved in the cause. 
Congress attempted to conform the practice of the courts with 
the United States, sitting within this state, to the practice of the 
state courts. A special statute for Louisiana was passed by 
Congress, May 26, 1824,10 by which it is enacted that the mode of 
proceeding in civil causes in the courts of the United States, that 
now are or may hereafter be established in the state of Louisiana, 
shall be conformable to the laws directing the mode of practice in 
the district courts of said state. Provided, the judge may alter the 
times limited or allowed for different proceedings in the state 
courts, and make by rule such other provisions, to adapt the said 
laws of procedure to the organization of the United States courts, 
and to avoid any discrepancy between such state laws and the laws 
of the United States. 
The object of this act has been almost completely nullified by 
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 That court was compelled to admit, that the term “civil 
cases,” used in the process act of 1824, would include cases at law 
or in equity. But, it held that the acts of Congress in the general 
legislation of the country have always distinguished between 
remedies at common law and in equity. To effectuate the purpose 
of the Legislature, the remedies in the courts of the United States 
are to be at common law or in equity—not according to the 
practice of the state courts, but according to the principles of 
                                                                                                             
 10. Act to Regulate the District Courts of Louisiana, Ch. 181, 4 Stat. 62 
(May 26, 1824), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId 
=llsl&fileName=004/llsl004.db&recNum=109.  
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common law and equity, as distinguished and defined in that 
country from which we derive our knowledge of those principles. 
Since there are no courts of equity, or state laws in Louisiana 
regulating the practice of equity cases, the federal courts in the 
state are bound to proceed according to the principles and usages 
of courts of equity, and the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. 
Louisiana had not then, and has never had, a representative of 
her legal system on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.∗ This decision, which was not given without a vigorous 
protest from Mr. Justice McLean, renders it absolutely necessary 
for a Louisiana lawyer, who desires to practice in the federal 
courts, to study the common law, in order to ascertain what is a 
common law case and what is a case in equity. When he finds out 
that his case is one in equity, he must become familiar with 
chancery practice in order to prosecute it with success.11  
If his case is a common law case, he can adopt the Louisiana 
practice of pleading, but he must be careful in the trial of the case 
to resort to the common law method of proceeding. The Supreme 
Court has held: 
First, that if the record contains the evidence, but no bills of 
exceptions, and nothing raising any point of law distinct 
from the evidence, the Supreme Court cannot revise the 
judgment on writ of error.12  
 
Second, if a case is tried by a jury, even though all the 
evidence may be reduced to writing and transmitted to the 
Supreme Court, that court cannot revise the judgment of the 
facts, as the Supreme Court of Louisiana does. This 
decision is based on the Seventh Amendment of the 
                                                                                                             
 ∗  Since the writing of this article, there has been a U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice from Louisiana: Edward Douglass White, who served from 1894-1921, 
and was Chief Justice from 1910-1921. 
 11. Gaines v. Relf, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 9, 14 (1841); Story v. Livingston, 13 
Pet. 368, 406 (1839); Ex Parte Story v. Story, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 339 (1838); Ex 
Parte Poultney v. City of La Fayette, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 472, 474 (1838); 
Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 658 (1835). 
 12. Minor v. Tillotson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 392, 394 (1844), 11 L.Ed. 312. 
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Constitution of the United States, which provides “that no 
fact once tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examinable in 
any court of the United States, than according to the rules 
of the common law.”13  
 
Third, when the judge passes on the law and the fact, if a 
jury trial is not claimed, the judge must find the facts, and 
the Supreme Court must treat such facts as conclusively 
settled and, therefore, cannot revise the case on the facts, 
even though the evidence on which the judge based his 
findings is transmitted in the record.14  
 
Fourth, the practice of the courts in Louisiana as to giving 
reasons for judgment, which the Louisiana law requires 
under penalty of nullity and as to the form and effect of 
verdicts of a jury, is governed by the acts of Congress and 
the rules of the common law, not by the laws of the state.15  
It is therefore perceived that, so far as practice is concerned, in 
the courts of the United States little is left of the state laws with 
which these courts are to conform. If the case is an equity case, 
there is absolutely no conformity with the state law. If it is a 
common law case, the pleadings and rules of evidence are the same 
as those in the courts of the state; the method of trial, and preparing 
a case for the appellate court, the form of the verdict and judgment, 
and the effect of the verdict are totally different. I do not perceive 
that the judicial acts of 1872 have made any material changes in 
the particulars I have mentioned. 
The act of Congress, approved June 8, 1872, departs from the 
practice of the state courts as to the number of peremptory 
challenges in civil cases; in the state courts, four peremptory 
challenges are allowed, while only three are permitted in the 
Federal Courts. The same rule applies to criminal cases, except in 
trials for treason and felony. The act of Congress approved June 1, 
1872, merely requires the practice pleadings and forms of 
                                                                                                             
 13. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830), 7 L.Ed 732. 
 14. United States v. King, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 833, 853–54 (1849), 12 L.Ed. 
934. 
 15. Parks v. Turner, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 39, 44 (1851), 13 L.Ed. 883. 
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proceedings, in other than equity and admiralty causes, to conform 
to the practice, pleadings and forms of proceeding in the state 
courts. This act seems to adopt the views of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, in regard to the process act of 1824, as it 
expressly excludes “equity causes” from its operation. 
II. CIVIL LAW 
The Justinian collections called the Corpus Juris Civilis, 
constitute the basis of modern civil law so far as private rights are 
concerned.  
The public law of the Romans, their criminal law, their laws of 
practice or procedure, and their laws as to private rights, before 
and after Justinian, are not received; though a few of the provisions 
and principles derived from these sources have been incorporated 
in the modern civil law system.  
Even the Justinian collections exercise little or no influence on 
modern civil law, except in regard to rights of Roman origin or 
growing out of transactions known to the Romans.  
The law in regard to bills of exchange and promissory notes, 
insurance, stocks, banks, the modern rights of corporations, the 
modern laws of trade and commerce, and the laws of community 
between the husband and wife are not of Roman origin, or they 
have been so radically and thoroughly transformed in the process 
of adaptation to the requirements of modern civilization that the 
germ of the Roman law can be scarcely traced. 
The Roman jurists are distinguished above all others, ancient or 
modern, for their classic mode of enunciating principles of law, as 
well as for the art of tracing, and the method of applying those 
principles. The celebrated metaphysician Leibnitz remarks:  
I have often said, that after the writings of the 
geometricians, there is nothing extant comparable for force 
and subtility with the writings of the Roman jurisconsults; 
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so much nerve is there in them, and so much profundity.16 
Again he says: 
I admire the digests, or rather the labors of the authors from 
whom the Digests are extracted; whether you consider the 
acumen of the reasoning, or the vigor of the expression, I 
have never seen anything more nearly approach the 
precision of mathematics.17 
The law of the Pandects is but a system of general legal 
principles. For this reason, the enlightened jurists of the civilized 
world resort to it as a magazine of jurisprudence, based on reason 
and philosophy, and therefore, in its application and usefulness, 
unrestricted by time and place. 
It is necessary however, that you should have some idea of the 
manner, in which the Roman law was gradually developed, and 
molded into the system embodied in the Corpus Juris Civilis, as 
well as of the sources of that law. I proceed to give you a rapid, 
and therefore imperfect, sketch of the history and development of 
the Roman law, preparatory to a discussion of its principles, so far 
as they are incorporated into the jurisprudence of Louisiana.
 It is well known that in the earliest period the Roman 
government was a limited monarchy, the political power being 
vested in king, senate and people. The people were separated into 
two classes: the patricians, or hereditary nobility, and the 
plebeians, or free citizens. At first, the plebeians were excluded 
from any participation in the government and from the use of the 
public lands. 
                                                                                                             
 16. In Latin: “In juris prudential regnat (romani). Dixi saepius post scripta 
geometrarum nihil extare quod vic ac subtilitate cum romanorum 
jurisconsultorum scriptis comparari possit:tantum nervi inest; tantum 
profunditatis.” Gottfried Wilhelm Baron von Leibniz (1646–1716), German 
philosopher and mathematician. NINETEENTH CENTURY NATION BUILDING AND 
THE LATIN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 57 (Janet Burke & Ted 
Humphrey ed. & trans., 2007). 
 17. In Latin: “Ego Digestorum opus, vel potius auctorum, unde excerpta 
sunt, labores admiror, nec quidquam  vidi, sive rationum acumen, sive dicendi 
nervos spectes, quod magis accedat ad mathematicorum . . . ” JOHN GEORGE 
PHILLIMORE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND HISTORY OF THE ROMAN LAW 
233 (William Benning & Co., London 1848). 
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The king and senate proposed laws that were submitted for 
adoption to the vote of the national assemblies, called the curiae, 
composed exclusively of patricians. 
In later times, the laws were submitted for adoption to 
assemblies, called centuriae, in which the plebeians, to a limited 
extent, obtained some share in legislation. The law adopted in 
assemblies of the curiae was called lex curiata, and law adopted in 
assemblies of the centuriae was called lex centuriata.  
When the kings were expelled, a republic was established, and 
two consuls, who were patricians, were substituted for the king. 
The plebeians, dissatisfied with the insignificant influence 
exercised by them in the assemblies of the centuriae, which had 
been so constituted as to almost overwhelm their voice by the 
weight of rank and wealth, succeeded, after severe contests, in 
establishing officers called “tribunes of the people”, to be chosen 
from the plebeians, and, for the protection of their rights, vested 
with authority to render any law ineffectual by a veto. 
Soon, however, the tribunes acquired the right of proposing 
laws to assemblies of the plebeians called comitia tribute, and 
these laws, when approved, were called plebiscita. 
The struggle between the two parties resulted in the adoption of 
the celebrated Law of the Twelve Tables.∗ This law is both a 
political constitution and a law in regard to private rights. One of 
its objects was to establish the political equality of the plebeians 
with the patricians, and to define the limits of judicial power then 
in the hands of the consuls. Besides this, it reduced to writing the 
laws in regard to private rights, which had previously existed, and 
merged the peculiar law of each tribe in one system. This law is 
also called lex decemviralis, from the number of persons selected 
to compose it. 
The decemvirate first appointed was composed solely of 
patricians; they reported ten tables. But the year following, a 
                                                                                                             
 ∗  In 450 BC. 
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decemvirate, composed of seven patricians and three plebeians, 
added two to the former ten. Those twelve were engraved on 
wood, ivory, or brass and exposed on the rostra for public 
examination. It is said that an Ephesian exile imparted his 
knowledge to the Roman legislators and, in recognition of his 
services, a statue was erected in the forum to the memory of 
Hermodorus. 
The Romans entertained the greatest reverence for the Twelve 
Tables and delighted to bestow encomiums on them as the highest 
evidence of the wisdom of their ancestors. They vaunted the 
superiority of Roman legislation over the jurisprudence of Draco, 
Solon and Lycurgus, which Cicero does not hesitate to characterize 
as rude and ridiculous while he asserts that the brief composition 
of the decemvirs surpasses in genuine value of the libraries of 
Grecian philosophy.18 The Twelve Tables survived the devastation 
of the Gauls, and subsisted at the time of Justinian; their 
subsequent loss has been imperfectly repaired by fragments, 
collected by modern critics, from the commentaries of Gaius 
contained in the Pandects, from Ulpian’s fragments, from the 
lately discovered Institutes of Gaius, and the Vatican fragments. 
After the Twelve Tables, the Romans divided their law into jus 
scriptum and jus non scriptum, or law established by custom. The 
Institutes of Justinian perpetuated this distinction and defined “the 
unwritten law to be that which usage has approved—for daily 
customs, established by the consent of those who use them, put on 
the character of the law.”19 The written law consisted of the leges, 
the plebiscita and the Senatus Consulta. 
                                                                                                             
 18. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS 223 (Clinton W. 
Keyes trans., 1977); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE ORATORE 123 (E.W. Sutton 
trans., Harvard Univ. Press, 1942). 
 19. In Latin: “Ex non scripto jus venit, quod usus comprobavit: nam diuturni 
mores cousensu utentium comprobati legem imitantur.”  See THE INSTITUTES OF 
JUSTINIAN 85 (Thomas Collett Sandars, trans. & ed., Longmans, Green, and Co. 
3d ed., London, 1865). 
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The leges were enacted on the proposal of a magistrate 
presiding in the Senate and adopted by the Roman people in the 
assemblies of the Centuriae, composed of patricians and plebeians. 
These related almost entirely to Public Law. 
The plebiscite were proposed by the tribune, and adopted by 
the plebeians alone in the comitia tribute. For this reason, they 
were binding on the plebeians only until, at a subsequent period, it 
was decreed that all the Roman people should be bound by the 
plebiscita.  
The Senatus Consulta were decreed by the Senate, without the 
concurrence of the plebeians, who objected to the force of these 
decrees as to them; but when the Senate submitted the plebiscite, 
the plebeians in turn acquiesced in the authority of the Senatus 
Consulta. 
The proper administration of justice in civil cases soon 
required the establishment of the office of Praetor. He was styled 
Praetor urbanus; his jurisdiction, at first, was restricted to cases in 
which both parties were citizens of Rome. The increase of business 
intercourse with strangers occasioned about a century later the 
establishment of another Praetor to decide the suits of strangers 
among themselves or with Romans. He was styled Praetor 
Perigrinus. The term of office of the Praetor was one year. 
The proper Roman law, jus civilis, was never applicable to 
strangers. It was intended for Roman citizens only. But when the 
Roman power was extended over Italy and other countries, the 
necessities arising out of the new relations, and the incessant 
intercourse with strangers, led the Romans to acknowledge and 
apply a universal natural law in addition to their peculiar jus civile. 
The principles of this universal natural law (called by them jus 
gentium) were at first applied to strangers, but subsequently they 
were extended to Romans also to moderate the rigor and correct 
the injustice arising from the strict application of the jus civile. 
This change was effected by the edicts of the Praetors, who 
annually, on taking possession of office, announced the legal 
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principles in accordance with which they would administer justice 
during the year. Each successive Praetor adopted such rules of his 
predecessor as had been sanctioned by reason and justice, so that 
the annual edicts, by continual repetition of the same principles, 
soon became in practice a fixed system of law. So fixed, indeed, 
had become the principles of the Praetorian edicts, and for such a 
long period had they been annually announced, that the annual 
edict assumed the name of the “Perpetual Edict.” This praetorian 
law was denominated jus honorarium, because, says the Institutes, 
“the magistrates who have honors in the state have given their 
sanction.”20  
The main principles of law having been thus established by the 
Twelve Tables and the Praetor’s edicts, the lawyers began to 
develop them more fully by interpretation. The law thus introduced 
by jurists was called auctoritas prudentum. These opinions of 
lawyers were never regarded as authority until Emperor Augustus 
allowed some distinguished jurists to answer in his name. In the 
reign of Tiberius, these responsa prudentum grew into 
considerable credit. But it was not until the reign of Hadrian that 
the responsa prudentum were vested with the authority of the law. 
He decreed that the unanimous opinion of the jurists, specially 
authorized to respond, should have the force of law. In case the 
lawyers disagreed, the judge should follow the opinion which he 
himself considered just. At a later period, Constantine determined, 
by special ordinance, what writings of the old jurists should have 
special authority. A century later, in the year 426, Theodosius II 
issued a more extensive ordinance, in which he confirmed, by 
name, the writings of Gaius, Ulpian, Paul, Papinian and 
Modestinus, and forbade the judges to depart from the opinion of 
these lawyers on questions of law. In case they differed in opinion, 
the Emperor ordained, the judges should be governed by a 
majority; in case of equal division, they should follow those to 
                                                                                                             
 20. In Latin: “. . .quod qui bonoremgerunt, id est magistratus, auctoritatem 
huic juri dederunt.” Id. at 83. 
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whom Papinian adhered. This ordinance was intended for the 
Eastern Empire, but it soon obtained force in the Western Empire 
as well. From Augustus to Trajan, says Gibbon, “the modest 
Caesars were content to promulgate their edicts in the various 
characters of a Roman Magistrate; and in the decrees of the Senate, 
the epistles and orations of the princes were respectfully 
inserted.”21 
The Institutes of Justinian expressly declare that the pleasure of 
the emperor has the vigor and effect of law, since the Roman 
people, by the royal law, have transferred to their prince the full 
extent of their own power and sovereignty. Therefore, whatever 
the emperor ordains by rescript, decree or edict is law. Such acts 
are called constitutions.22  
In what manner the emperors were invested with legislative 
power, is not precisely known. The newly discovered Institutes of 
Gaius state that it was in virtue of a law, but it is uncertain, 
whether this was a general law passed on the transition of the 
government from a republican to the imperial form or a law passed 
on the accession of each emperor. At all events, from the time of 
Hadrian, the public and private jurisprudence was molded by the 
will of the sovereign. The “gloomy and intricate forest of ancient 
laws” in the language of Tertullian, “was cleared away by the axe 
of royal mandates and constitutions.”23 
The period just preceding Augustus surpassed all the others for 
the variety and profundity of the productions of its jurists, whose 
learning and sagacity advanced the science of law to a high degree 
of perfection, but little is preserved of their writings to vindicate 
their title of the appellation of “the classical jurists.” It is certain, 
                                                                                                             
 21. EDWARD GIBBON, 5 THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE 
ROMAN EMPIRE 268 (John Murray, London 1854) 
 22. In Latin: “Sed et quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem; cum lege 
regia quae de ejusimperio lata est, populus ei et in eum omne imperium suum et 
potestatem concessit. Quodcumque ergo imperator per epistolam constituit, vel 
cognoscens decrevit, vel edicto praecepit, legem esse constat; hae sunt quae 
constitutions appellantur.” Supra note 19, at 82-83. 
 23.  See GIBBON, supra note 21, at 269. 
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however, that the jurists of the age, in which Cicero’s voice 
resounded in the forum, being thoroughly imbued with Grecian 
philosophy and the logic of Aristotle and the stoics, established 
law as an art on a certain and general theory, and diffused over its 
then-shapeless mass, the light of order and eloquence. The 
foremost and most distinguished of these jurists was Servius 
Sulpicius. 
The period from Augustus to Alexander Severus is illustrated 
by the writings of Gaius, Papinian, Ulpian, Paulus and Modestinus, 
none of which, save the Institute of Gaius, have been preserved 
except such fragments as are contained in the Pandects or in the 
Fragmenta Vaticana. The Institutes of Gaius are particularly 
interesting to us because they formed the foundation of the 
Institutes of Justinian. It was not until the year 1816 that the 
genuine Institutes of Gaius were discovered by Neibuhr in a codex 
rescriptus in the library of the Cathedral chapter of Verona. 
While the Syrian priest of the sun, Heliogabalus, surrounded 
his throne with eunuchs, buffoons, and dwarfs, made senators of 
coachmen and strollers, and created a senate of women to decide 
upon questions of fashion, his successor and cousin, Alexander 
Severus, was learning the great art of ruling from the celebrated 
Christian doctor Origen who, in the early part of the third century, 
was the friend of the future emperor’s mother. Alexander Severus 
never became a Christian, but he revered Christianity and its divine 
founder. He rendered divine honors to Jesus Christ, whose statue 
was placed in his oratory. He even made a proposition to the 
Senate to admit to rank among the gods the founder of a religion 
whose morals were so pure. But the Senate, having consulted the 
Oracles, received a response that if this new apotheosis were to be 
celebrated, the temples would soon be abandoned and all of the 
world become Christian. Notwithstanding the good will of 
Alexander towards Christianity, the Roman legislation was not 
changed in its hostile disposition towards the disciples of Jesus 
Christ. The legists of the imperial palace, Ulpian and Paulus, 
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whose names are as imposing in jurisprudence as they are odious 
in the annals of Christianity, took pleasure in compiling the 
ordinances which devoted the Christians to death. 
The assassination of Alexander Severus at Mayence, in his 
28th year, extinguished the hopes of good government, which 
seemed so flattering at his accession to the throne. 
The Roman law never felt the influence of the gospel until after 
the Battle of Actium for Christianity was fought in the year 312. 
The famous labarum of Constantine floated from a staff in the 
form of a cross; above it sparkled a crown of gold and precious 
stones, in the midst of which was the monogram of Christ.  
Under this banner, two religions and two worlds met at the 
Milvian bridge; two religions were face to face, armed on the 
banks of the Tiber, in view of the capitol. Maxentius interrogated 
the Sybilline books, sacrificed lions, and opened pregnant women, 
to search the bosom of infants torn from their mothers’ wombs, for 
it was supposed hearts that had never palpitated could not conceal 
imposture. Constantine came by a divine impulse and the greatness 
of his genius. These words are engraved on his triumphal arch, 
Instinctu divinitatis, mentis magnitudine.24 
Scarcely had the “Successor of the Caesars” entered Rome as 
victor when he sought out the representative of the Christian 
church, the purple of whose spiritual royalty until now had been 
the blood of the martyrs, and presented to him the Lateran palace 
as a pontifical residence. 
Constantine, born in ancient Maesia, brought up at the court of 
Nicomedia, and proclaimed Emperor in Britain, had no sympathy 
with Rome. Julius Caesar had once wished to rebuild Troy, the 
                                                                                                             
 24. The entirety of the engraving of Constantine’s triumphal arch reads: 
To the Emperor Caesar Flavius Constantinus Maximus Pius Felix 
Augustus the Senate and the Roman People dedicate this arch as a 
memorial to his military triumphs, who by the inspiration of divinity 
and his own genius avenged, with righteous arms in one instant, the 
Republic against the tyrant and his faction. 
The selection of “Instinctu divinitatis, mentis magnitudine” translated from the 
Latin is: “to divine inspiration, mental magnitude (genius).” 
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fabled cradle of the Roman race, and to make it the seat of Empire. 
Constantine took up the idea with modification and fixed his 
throne at Byzantium, which he called Constantinople. The rising 
city was enriched with the spoils of Greece and Asia; they brought 
idols of the now-unworshipped gods and the statues of great men. 
The old metropolis also paid its tribute to the youthful rival now 
growing at its side; Constantinople clothed itself with the 
nakedness of other cities. The families of senatorial and equestrian 
rank were brought from the banks of the Tiber to those of the 
Bosphorus, here to find palaces equal to those they had forsaken. 
From this time, the Christian religion became predominant and the 
Latin language was gradually displaced by Greek. The two 
principle cities had each an administration of its own, unconnected 
with that of the Empire; the former state authorities thereby 
became municipal magistrates. The Empire itself was divided into 
four praefecturae praetoriae: the praefectus Orientis resided at 
Constantinople; the praefectus Illyrici, at Thessalonica; the 
praefectus Italiae, at Milan, and the praefectus Galliae, at Treves.  
Another political change of considerable importance in the 
history of private law was that the natural free development of the 
law by the courts and jurists became more and more limited, in 
conformity with the spirit of the autocratic government. The 
autocracy assumed even the interpretation of the law, and hence 
the multitudinous imperial decrees and constitutions. 
Before Constantine, most of the Imperial ordinances were 
decrees and rescripts. A decree was a decision in a judicial cause, 
which had been brought by appeal before the Auditorium principis. 
 The rescript was the answer or direction of the emperor upon 
applications, or questions, in doubtful cases. 
The edicts were general ordinances, intended for the whole 
people, and called constitutiones generales.  
During the reign of Constantine and subsequently, the edicts 
became frequent and often introduced extensive changes in the 
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constitution of the nation, for the prevalence of Christianity had 
changed, or subverted, many ancient opinions and usages. 
The imperial constitutions, or edicts, having become very 
numerous and complex, led two jurists, about the middle of the 5th 
century, to make two compilations; that of Gregorius contained the 
constitutions from Hadrian to Constantine, and that of Hermogenes 
was a supplement to the former, containing the constitutions of 
Diocletian and Maximian. 
These were followed by the Theodosian Code (Codex 
Theodosianus). Sixteen jurists compiled this code under an 
ordinance of the Emperor Theodosius the Younger; it was a 
collection of the edicts and many of the rescripts and was 
published as a code for the Eastern Empire in the year 438. 
Theodosius sent this code to his son-in-law, Valentinian III, who 
confirmed it in the same year for the Western Empire. The 
Theodosian code consisted in sixteen books, each of which was 
subdivided into titles; from the conclusion of the sixth book to the 
end of it remains entire. Lately, the first five books and part of the 
sixth have been discovered at Turin. 
The Fragmenta Vaticana, edited by Angelo Mai in 1823 from 
a codex rescriptus of the Vatican Library, contains fragments of 
law-writers from the time of Alexander Severus to Justinian, and 
of imperial constitutions. They appear to be remains of a large 
collection during the time that intervened, between the Codex 
Hermogenianus and the Codex Theodosianus. 
In the year 500, Theodoric, King of the Ostrogoths, after the 
fall of the Roman Empire of the West, issued an edict intended not 
only for the Romans, but also for the Ostrogoths. This edict is 
entirely derived from the Roman law, especially from the Codex 
Theodosianus, the later novels and Pauli sententiae rescriptae. 
Alaric II, King of the Visigoths, in the year 506, published a 
code affecting only the Romans living in his Empire. This code is a 
compilation from the previous codes, the later novels, and the 
writings of Gaius, Paulus and Papinian.  
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This collection is called the Breviarium Alaricianum and in it 
many passages have been preserved which would otherwise have 
been lost from the first five books of the Theodosian Code and the 
writings of Gaius, Paulus and Papinian. 
After the time of Theodosius II, nothing was done in the East 
to facilitate the administration and study of the law until Justinian 
ascended the imperial throne in the year 527. 
Justinian was the first, after Theodosius, who undertook a new 
collection of the imperial constitutions, which was intended to 
form a substitute for previous collections.  
For this purpose, he appointed ten lawyers; among them was 
the celebrated Tribonian and at their head was Johannes the Ex-
quaestor of the Sacred Palace.  
In fourteen months, the labors of this commission were 
completed. This new code consisted of twelve books; it was 
confirmed by a special ordinance prohibiting the use of the older 
collections of rescripts and edicts. This first code of Justinian is 
called the Codex Vetus and is now entirely lost.  
After the code was published, Justinian, in the year 530, 
ordered Tribonian and sixteen other jurists to select all of the most 
valuable passages from the writings of the old jurists, which were 
regarded as authoritative, and arrange them according to their 
subjects under suitable headings. He gave them extensive powers 
and suspended the citation law of Theodosius II, who had 
prohibited citation from the writings of any other jurists than those 
specified in his ordinance. The Tribonian commission, however, 
were not confined to the letter of the passages they might select. 
They had the privilege to abridge, to add, and to alter, but were 
directed to avoid repetitions, remove contradictions, and omit the 
obsolete. The result was that the extracts contained in the Pandects 
did not always truly represent the originals, which were often 
interpolated, or amended, to conform to the views of the 
commission as to the existing law. 
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These alterations, additions, or modifications were called 
Emblemata Triboniani. 
The work was completed in three years; within this time the 
commission had extracted from the writings of thirty-nine jurists 
all that was considered valuable. It is said the writings inspected 
and extracted from consisted of two thousand treatises, containing, 
in the aggregate, three million lines, which were reduced to fifty 
books containing one hundred and fifty thousand lines. Over every 
extract a heading was placed containing the name of the work from 
which it was, or should have been, derived. 
The whole composition consisting of fifty books was entitled 
Digesta sive Pandectae juris enucleate ex omni vetere collecti. The 
Pandects were published December 16, 533 A.D., and were put in 
force on December 20, 533. In compiling the Pandects, the 
commission met with important unsettling controversies. 
Justinian, however, settled thirty-four of the controversial 
questions before the commencement of the Pandects, and before 
its completion these decisions increased to fifty. These decisions 
were afterwards embodied in the new code of Justinian called 
Codex repetitae praelectionis. 
As the Pandects were unsuited to the use of those just 
beginning the study of law, Justinian ordered Tribonian, with the 
assistance of Theophilius and Dorotheus, to prepare a brief treatise, 
which should contain the elements of legal science. 
This resulted in the Institutes, published November 21, 533, 
which obtained legal force on the same day as the Pandects—
December 30, 533. 
This work is but a revised edition of Gaius’ Institutes, in which 
the obsolete was omitted and the new constitutions of Justinian 
were referred to. After the publication of the Pandects and 
Institutes, the code was revised by Tribonian and four other 
lawyers. This revision included a great many new constitutions and 
the fifty decisions; it was put in operation November 16, 534, and 
the old code was abolished. 
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During the long reign of Justinian, after the publication of the 
new code, many constitutions were issued, by which the laws were 
materially changed; the greater part of these new constitutions 
were written in Greek and are also called novels:  Novellae 
Constintutiones. 
After the death of Justinian, a collection of 168 novels was 
made, 154 of which had been issued by him and the residue by his 
successors.  
Justinian’s law collections were intended only for the East, but 
after he conquered the Ostrogoths, who then ruled Italy, he sent his 
compilations there, and, by special edict, ordered them to be 
introduced in the court and law schools.  
During all the political changes which subsequently took place 
in the West, the use of Justinian’s collections continued 
uninterruptedly, even in the Empire of the Lombards in France.  
 
 
